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The attorney-client privilege protects essential communications between
clients and their lawyers from unwelcome and sometimes potentially ruinous
exposure. Reflecting its importance, observers have described the attorneyclient privilege as one of the legal profession’s “crown jewels.”1 The attorneyclient privilege applies to “(1) a communication (2) made between privileged
persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance for the client.”2 “Privileged persons” include the client or prospective
client, the lawyer, agents of the client or prospective client and the lawyer who
facilitate communications between them, and agents of the lawyer who assist in
the client’s representation.3
Organizational clients, like individuals, are entitled to assert the attorneyclient privilege concerning communications within its scope.4 For example,
+
Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Overland Park, Kansas. J.D., University of
Kansas. Opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.
1. John M. Barkett, Attorney-Client Privilege, LITIG., Winter 2019, at 34, 34.
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. L. INST. 2000).
3. Id. § 70.
4. As countless courts have recited in opinions, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the
client. See, e.g., Fiduciary Tr. Int’l of Cal. v. Klein, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 67 (Ct. App. 2017); Ross
v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 129 N.E.3d 641, 653 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md.
v. Powers, 164 A.3d 138, 151 (Md. 2017); Crossman v. Trs. of Fayetteville Tech. Cmty. Coll., 832
S.E.2d 223, 236 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 788 (N.C. 2003));
Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 89 N.E.3d 536, 541 (Ohio 2016); Commonwealth v. McCullough,

39

40

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70.1:1

corporations can assert the privilege,5 as can partnerships,6 limited liability
companies,7 governmental bodies,8 homeowners’ associations and other private
associations,9 and trusts.10 Assuming that a communication otherwise qualifies
as privileged, it does not matter whether the lawyer involved is in-house or
outside counsel.11
In the organizational context, a recurring problem is determining who among
the entity’s employees speaks on its behalf, such that communications between
the entity’s lawyers and those employees may be protected against discovery by

201 A.3d 221, 242 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018); In re Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 829 S.E.2d 707, 712 (S.C.
2019); Arnoldy v. Mahoney, 791 N.W.2d 645, 657 (S.D. 2010); In re Cook, 597 S.W.3d 589, 597
(Tex. App. 2020).
5. Affiniti Colo., LLC v. Kissinger & Fellman, P.C., 461 P.3d 606, 614 (Colo. App. 2019);
Nemours Found. v. Arroyo, 292 So. 3d 6, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); St. Simons Waterfront, LLC
v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 103 (Ga. 2013); Harris Mgmt., Inc. v.
Coulombe, 151 A.3d 7, 15 (Me. 2016); Frank v. Morgans Hotel Grp. Mgmt., LLC, 116 N.Y.S.3d
889, 891 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d
703, 704–05 (N.Y. 1989)); Hermanson v. MultiCare Health Sys., Inc., 448 P.3d 153, 159 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2019); State ex rel. HCR ManorCare, LLC v. Stucky, 776 S.E.2d 271, 282 (W. Va. 2015).
6. See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 930, 936, 939–40 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the
attorney-client privilege to communications with a partnership’s independent consultant).
7. See, e.g., Carpenters Pension Tr. v. Lindquist Fam., LLC, No. C-13-01063 DMR, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54335, at *8–12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014) (applying corporate attorney-client
privilege law to an LLC); Montgomery v. eTreppid Techs., LLC, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179–87
(D. Nev. 2008) (reasoning that an LLC should be treated like a corporation for federal common law
attorney-client privilege purposes); In re Haynes, 577 B.R. 711, 736–37 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2017)
(applying the subject matter test for the privilege to an LLC); Fla. Marlins Baseball Club, LLC v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London Subscribing to Policy No. 893/HC/97/9096, 900 So. 2d
720, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding the privilege with respect to an LLC’s in-house
lawyer).
8. See, e.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berywn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 621 (7th Cir. 2010)
(explaining the importance of recognizing the attorney-client privilege where government agencies
are concerned); Banks v. Off. of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, 222 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2004)
(stating that there is “no doubt that government agencies” may invoke the attorney-client privilege);
Wood v. Superior Ct. of San Diego Cnty., 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798, 808 (Ct. App. 2020) (“It is well
settled that a public entity enjoys an attorney-client relationship with its lawyers and the attorneyclient privilege protects communications made in the course of that relationship.”); Affiniti Colo.,
461 P.3d at 614 (noting that the “privilege applies to . . . public entities”); Suffolk Constr. Co. v.
Div. of Cap. Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 38 (Mass. 2007) (stating that qualifying communications
between governmental entities and their counsel are protected under standard attorney-client
privilege rules); Nelson v. City of Billings, 412 P.3d 1058, 1068 (Mont. 2018) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege “protect[s] governmental agencies and employees like any other party to
civil litigation”); Paxton v. City of Dall., 509 S.W.3d 247, 260 (Tex. 2017) (explaining the
importance of the privilege in the governmental context).
9. See, e.g., Fouts v. Breezy Point Condo. Ass’n, 851 N.W.2d 845, 849–50 (Wis. Ct. App.
2014).
10. Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 299 P.3d 1058, 1066–67 (Utah 2013).
11. FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 892 F.3d 1264, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018);
Cormack v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 392, 397 (Fed. Cl. 2014).
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the organization’s adversaries and other third parties.12 And, of course, as
organizations experience the inevitable turnover in their workforces, another
issue surfaces: when, if ever, does the attorney-client privilege attach to
communications between the organization’s lawyers and former employees of
the organization? This Article strives to answer that question.
Looking ahead, Part I of this Article outlines the tests that courts apply when
analyzing attorney-client privilege claims involving organizational clients.
These tests, which control the privilege determination when current employees
of the organization communicate with lawyers for the organization, provide the
foundation for analyzing privilege claims where former employees are
concerned. Part II examines the three approaches that courts have taken when
deciding whether lawyers’ communications with a client’s former employees
should be protected by the attorney-client privilege. In doing so, it discusses the
leading case supporting each approach. Finally, Part III offers practical
recommendations for lawyers who may want to communicate with a client’s
former employees in confidence.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Courts have historically applied two tests to analyze organizational attorneyclient privilege claims: the “control group” test and the “subject matter” test.
Some courts have adopted a third test that closely tracks the subject matter test,13
often called the “modified subject matter test.”14 The hierarchical control group
test has largely been replaced by the subject matter tests, although a few courts
do still employ the control group approach to the privilege.15
A. The Control Group Test
Once a leading corporate attorney-client privilege test, the control group test
appears to have crystalized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.16 The Westinghouse Electric court reasoned that if the employee
12. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D. Del. 1962)
(“While [attorney-client privilege] rules may be simply stated, the problem of applying them when
a corporation is involved is quite difficult. . . . Who speaks for the corporation? Are the statements
of all the employees the statements of the client?”).
13. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935–36 (8th Cir. 1994).
14. See, e.g., Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass’n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998)
(“Following Upjohn, two tests have emerged to define the client in the corporate context: the
subject-matter test, and the modified subject-matter test.”).
15. See, e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 752 P.2d 999, 1002 (Alaska 1988) (referring to ALASKA
R. EVID. 503(a)(2), which “adopt[ed] the ‘control group’ test”); Caldwell v. Advoc. Condell Med.
Ctr., 87 N.E.3d 1020, 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (“In order to determine which employees of a
corporation enjoy the attorney-client privilege when communicating with an attorney on behalf of
the corporation, Illinois applies the control-group test.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d
643, 646 (Tex. 1995) (referring to TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 503(a)(2), which implemented the control
group test).
16. City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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communicating with a corporation’s lawyer is positioned “to control or even to
take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may
take” based on the lawyer’s advice, “or if he is an authorized member of a body
or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer” and the attorney-client
privilege applies.17 More succinctly, for a communication to be privileged under
the control group test, it must be made by an employee who “has the authority
to control, or substantially participate in, a decision regarding action to be taken
on the advice of a lawyer, or is an authorized member of a group that has such
power.”18 Only these employees qualify as the client for privilege purposes.19
In short, the control group test as originally crafted essentially requires that the
employee a lawyer communicates with be a member of senior management with
ultimate decision-making authority for the communication to be privileged.20
Unfortunately, the control group test limits lawyers’ ability to communicate
candidly with mid- and low-level employees of the corporation or other
organization, thereby restricting the lawyers’ access to potentially valuable
information.21 These limitations, in turn, impair lawyers’ ability to properly
advise their clients.22 In this way the control group test frustrates a key purpose
of the attorney-client privilege.23
Some courts, correctly recognizing that organizational decision-making tends
to be a process and is often collaborative, have relaxed the control group test. In
Caldwell v. Advocate Condell Medical Center,24 for example, the court
explained that under Illinois law,
an employee whose advisory role to top management in a particular
area is such that a final decision would not normally be made without
his or her opinion, and whose opinion in fact forms the basis of any
final decision by those with actual authority, is properly within the
control group.25
17. Id. at 485.
18. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968).
19. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 189 (6th ed. 2017).
20. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 257–58 (Ill. 1982); see also
Garrison v. Gen. Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 518–19 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (determining that
GMC’s “officers, directors, [and] department heads” constituted the corporation’s control group).
21. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1981) (explaining the control
group test’s drawbacks).
22. Id.
23. See State v. Robinson, 209 A.3d 25, 46 (Del. 2019) (“The privilege was designed to
encourage full disclosure by a client to his or her attorney in order to facilitate the rendering of legal
advice.”); Neuman v. State, 773 S.E.2d 716, 719 (Ga. 2015) (“The privilege allows for open
communications between an attorney and his or her client . . . thereby enabling the attorney to
gather complete and accurate information about the client’s situation.”).
24. Caldwell v. Advoc. Condell Med. Ctr., 87 N.E.3d 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
25. Id. at 1036 (citing Consolidation Coal Co., 432 N.E.2d at 258).
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Thus, under this formulation of the control group test, the control group may
extend beyond the actual organizational decision-makers.26 Even under this
more liberal interpretation, however, the control group test does not protect as
privileged lawyers’ communications with employees who merely supply an
organization’s decision-makers with facts.27
B. The Subject Matter Test
In comparison to the control group test, the subject matter test affords much
broader privilege protection to corporate and other organizational clients. Under
the subject matter test as originally conceived, a lawyer’s communication with
any employee may be privileged if (1) the lawyer is representing the corporation
in his or her capacity as a lawyer; (2) the communication is intended to secure
legal advice for the corporation; (3) the employee is communicating with the
lawyer at a superior’s request or direction; and (4) the employee’s duties or
responsibilities include the subject of the communication.28 Applying this test,
the employee’s position or rank is irrelevant to the privilege analysis.29 The
Supreme Court embraced the subject matter approach in Upjohn Co. v. United
States,30 which is regarded as “the foundational case” on the attorney-client
privilege in the organizational realm.31 In Upjohn, the court rejected the control
group test in favor of a subject matter approach essentially because, as noted
earlier, the control group test “overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to
protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but
also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and
informed advice.”32
Although the Supreme Court rejected the control group test in favor of some
form of subject matter test for application of the attorney-client privilege in a
corporate setting, the Court declined to formulate a specific test.33 The Court’s
reluctance to do so has since led courts to reason that there are two forms of the

26. See Mlynarski v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 572 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (“Under the control-group test, there are two tiers of corporate employees whose
communications with the corporation’s attorney are protected. The first tier consists of the
decision-makers, or top management. The second tier consists of those employees who directly
advise top management, and upon whose opinions and advice the decision-makers rely.”).
27. Caldwell, 87 N.E.3d at 1036; Doe v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, 34 N.E.3d 652, 673 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015) (quoting Consolidation Coal Co., 432 N.E.2d at 258).
28. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394–95 (1981) (sketching the
circumstances of the communications to which the court applied the attorney-client privilege); see
also EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 192 (describing the subject matter test as it developed prior to
Upjohn as including the third and fourth elements listed above).
29. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 189.
30. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394–95.
31. In re Gen. Motors, LLC, Ignition Switch Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
32. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
33. Id. at 396.

44

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70.1:1

subject matter test.34 In any event, it is clear following Upjohn that under the
subject matter test, however it is articulated, a lawyer’s confidential
communications with any employee are privileged when they concern matters
within the scope of the employee’s responsibilities and the employee is aware
that the communications are intended to enable or facilitate the lawyer’s
representation of the corporation.35 In this way, the subject matter test is a
functional test with the fundamental goal of enhancing the flow of legally
consequential or relevant information from knowledgeable people inside the
organization to the organization’s lawyers.36
The subject matter test is superior to the control group test because the subject
matter test recognizes that employees outside the organization’s control group
may know facts that are essential to the organization’s need for, or reliance on,
legal advice. The subject matter test also “more realistically reflects the process
of corporate information gathering and dissemination” and how corporations
make decisions.37 It is therefore understandable that the subject matter test has
widely displaced the control group test.
C. The Modified Harper & Row Test, Diversified Industries Test, or Modified
Subject Matter Test
The third test, which was formulated before the Supreme Court embraced the
subject matter approach in Upjohn, is often called the “modified Harper & Row
test,” or the “Diversified Industries test,” after the federal cases from which it
derives: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,38 and Diversified Industries,

34. See, e.g., Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass’n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998)
(“Following Upjohn, two tests have emerged to define the client in the corporate context: the
subject-matter test, and the modified subject-matter test.”).
35. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v. Cieslak, Nos. 2:15-cv-01189-JAD-GWF,
2:13-cv-00596-JAD-GWF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107457, at *21 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2015)
(“Upjohn holds that the privilege applies to communications with corporate employees, regardless
of their position, when the communications concern matters within the scope of the employee’s
corporate duties and the employee is aware that the information is being furnished to enable the
attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation.”); MGA Ent., Inc. v. Nat’l Prods. Ltd., No. CV
10-07083 JAK (SSx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108408, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (“According
to the Supreme Court, the privilege applies to communications by any corporate employee
regardless of position when the communications concern matters within the scope of the
employee’s corporate duties and the employee is aware that the information is being furnished to
enable the attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation.”); United States v. Ghavami, 882 F.
Supp. 2d 532, 538–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Within a corporation . . . the attorney-client privilege
protects communications by corporate employees to counsel for the corporation who is acting as a
lawyer, as long as the communications are made at the direction of corporate superiors in order to
secure legal advice and the employees are aware that they are being questioned in connection with
the provision of such advice.”).
36. See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 459 (1982) (discussing Upjohn).
37. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 191.
38. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
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Inc. v. Meredith.39 The Harper & Row and Diversified Industries courts were
persuaded that the control group test was undesirable for at least two reasons.
First, it inhibits the free flow of material information from employees to the
corporation’s lawyers and thereby defeats the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege by impairing the lawyers’ ability to marshal the facts necessary to
properly advise their client.40 Second, it potentially dissuades employees from
speaking with corporate counsel “in a good faith effort to promote compliance
with the complex laws governing corporate activity.”41 These courts favored “a
more reasoned approach” to corporate attorney-client privilege questions that
focused on “why an attorney was consulted, rather than with whom the attorney
communicated.”42 The Diversified Industries court thus framed the corporate
attorney-client privilege test preferably to be applied as follows:43
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee’s
communication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of
securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication
did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made
the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the
subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the
employee’s corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not
disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents.44
The modified Harper & Row test or Diversified Industries test is essentially
the subject matter test with the “need to know” element added,45 hence the
modified subject matter test description.46 As should be apparent, the “need”
refers to certain employees’ need for the lawyer’s advice to perform their duties
or to act upon the lawyer’s advice for the organization’s benefit—not to the
lawyer’s need for the information known by the employees.47
39. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).
40. Id. at 609.
41. Id.
42. Id. (referring to the Harper & Row test).
43. As noted earlier, some courts describe the Harper & Row test or the Diversified Industries
test as the modified subject matter test even though the test pre-dates the Supreme Court’s decision
in Upjohn. See, e.g., Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass’n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998)
(combining the Harper & Row and Diversified Industries tests).
44. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609.
45. See S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 n.10 (Fla. 1994) (explaining
that the Diversified Industries court “modified the subject matter test in an effort to focus on why
the attorney was consulted and to prevent the routine channeling of information through the
attorney to prevent subsequent disclosure”).
46. Of note, one court has credited the Harper & Row court with formulating the subject
matter test, and stated that the modified subject matter test originated with the Diversified Industries
court. See Keefe v. Bernard, 774 N.W.2d 663, 671–72 (Iowa 2009) (discussing the various
attorney-client privilege tests).
47. See Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 610–11 (noting that the corporation carefully
avoided disseminating the information at issue beyond those employees immediately concerned
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II. THE PRIVILEGE AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENT
A. Background and Overview
Courts formulated the control group, subject matter, and modified subject
matter tests for the privilege with organizations’ current employees in mind. The
extension of an organization’s attorney-client privilege to former employees is
generally traced to Chief Justice Burger’s concurring opinion in Upjohn.48 As
noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Upjohn declined to formulate a specific
privilege test, and it also passed on deciding whether the attorney-client privilege
should attach to the Upjohn lawyers’ communications with former employees
regarding activities that occurred while they were employed by the
corporation.49 Chief Justice Burger argued that the Supreme Court should have
created a clear standard for applying the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context, and he would have extended that standard to corporate counsel’s
communications with former employees.50 If Chief Justice Burger would have
had his way, the Court would have established
[A] general rule [that] a communication is privileged at least when . .
. an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the
management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct
within the scope of employment. The attorney must be one authorized
by the management to inquire into the subject and must be seeking
information to assist counsel in . . . (a) evaluating whether the
employee’s conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b)
assessing the legal consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c)
formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have been or
may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.51
Of course, Chief Justice Burger did not get his way in Upjohn. In the years
since, courts have somewhat inconsistently extended the attorney-client

with the matter); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 620 (D.D.C. 1979) (“The
privilege applies to the communication only if the employee is the source of the information going
to the attorney or is a regular conduit for such information, or, in response, if the information is
revealed in the attorney’s advice and the employee to whom the information is disclosed has a ‘need
to know’ the information to carry out his own duties.”).
48. See Cool v. BorgWarner Diversified Transmission Prods., Inc., No. IP 02-960-C(B/S),
2003U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20137, at *3–5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2003) (discussing Chief Justice Burger’s
concurrence in Upjohn).
49. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 n.3 (1981) (“Petitioners argue[ ] that the
privilege should nonetheless apply to communications by these former employees concerning
activities during their period of employment. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals
had occasion to address this issue, and we decline to decide it without the benefit of treatment
below.”).
50. See id. at 402–03 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“I believe that we should articulate a standard
that will govern similar cases and afford guidance to corporations, counsel advising them, and
federal courts.”).
51. Id. (emphasis added).
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privilege to lawyers’ communications with clients’ former employees.52 This is
particularly true when you factor in control group jurisdictions, where former
employees, by definition, cannot be part of an organization’s control group.53
In many jurisdictions, courts reason that lawyers’ communications with
former employees concerning events or matters that occurred while the former
employees worked for the organization are privileged if they otherwise satisfy
the subject matter test or modified subject matter test.54 The privilege generally

52. See infra notes 53–58 (collecting cases).
53. See, e.g., Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (applying Illinois law and refusing to extend the privilege to former employees).
54. See, e.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 606 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the Upjohn analysis
“applies equally to former employees”); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996)
(quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981)) (applying the
privilege to “ex-employees”); Jacobs v. Alam, No. 15-10516, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100618, at
*17 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2020) (applying the attorney-client privilege to a former city employee);
Hairston v. Royal Bldg. Prods., Inc., No. 1:18cv00003, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63776, at *2–3
(W.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2019) (following In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 606); Subramanian v. Lupin Inc., No.
17-CV-5040 (RA) (KHP), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68776, at *5–8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2019)
(recognizing the attorney-client privilege in the former client context, but noting that in the absence
of a privilege log or the submission of particular communications, it could not rule); MF Glob.
Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 232 F. Supp. 3d 558, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting
Indergrit v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 08-cv-9361, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150565, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
31, 2016)); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, 304 F.R.D. 494, 498–500 (E.D. La.
2015) (predicting how the Louisiana Supreme Court would rule); Goswami v. DePaul Univ., No.
12 C 7167, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44249, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2014) (explaining that the
Illinois control group test did not apply, and federal law controlled the privilege question); Gary
Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Enters., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1533 (BSJ) (JCF), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 54154, at *16–17 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011) (applying the attorney-client privilege where
the former employee was deposed regarding his work while employed by the defendant); New York
v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-0644(LEK/DEP), 2011 WL 13205947, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 23, 2011)
(“Cason’s discussions with counsel for the DOI that occurred during the course of his employment
with DOI and those of whose ‘nature and purpose’ was for the DOI’s counsel to learn facts related
to this lawsuit that the defendant Cason was aware of as a result of his employment, regardless of
when they occurred, are privileged.”); Weber v. FUJIFILM Med. Sys. U.S.A., No. 3:10 CV 401
(JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82340, at *25 (D. Conn. July 27, 2011) (refusing to reconsider an
earlier decision recognizing the privilege); In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 2d 761, 765
(E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Because [the witness’s] testimony concerned matters within the scope of her
former responsibilities with [the] defendant corporation and because her conversations with defense
counsel may be relevant to [the] defendant’s legal strategy, her communications with defense
counsel fall within the attorney-client privilege.”); Fisher v. Halliburton, Nos. H-05-1731, H-061971, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14736, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2009) (“Richard’s deposition
testimony and preparation for deposition almost exclusively concern[ed] events within the scope
of his duties while working for defendants. . . . Therefore, . . . all communications between Richard
and the defendants’ counsel are protected as privileged provided they relate to events concerning
Richard’s duties while employed by defendants.”); Misner v. Potter, No. 2:07-CV-0330 TS, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136920, at *5 (D. Utah June 19, 2008) (“[U]nder . . . Upjohn and its progeny, the
attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications concerning matters within the
scope of the employee’s corporate duties whether or not they are currently employed.”); City of
N.Y. v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., No. 06 CV 2233 (JBW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117698, at *23
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege applies to communications between in-
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does not, however, protect communications between organizations’ lawyers and
former employees concerning matters or issues that occurred or arose after the
former employees left the organization.55 In the latter instance, courts treat
former employees like any other third-party fact witness.56 Other courts hold
that former employees generally should be treated like any other third-party fact
witness, while recognizing that unusual factual circumstances may compel a
different result.57 Still other courts flatly decline to recognize the attorney-client
privilege where lawyers for a corporation or other organization communicate
with former employees.58
B. Recognizing the Privilege in the Former Employee Context
Although only a district court decision, and thus lacking precedential value,59
Peralta v. Cendant Corp.60 is generally regarded as the leading case on the
application of the attorney-client privilege to former employees. In that case,
house counsel for a company and that company’s former employee.”); Export-Import Bank of the
U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Virtually all courts hold
that communications between company counsel and former company employees are privileged if
they concern information obtained during the course of employment.”); Cool v. BorgWarner
Diversified Transmission Prods., Inc., No. IP 02-960-C(B/S), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20137, at *5–
6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2003) (citing In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 606); Miramar Constr. Co. v. Home
Depot, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184–85 (D.P.R. 2001) (applying Puerto Rico law and reasoning
that applying the privilege to communications with former employees was consistent with the
underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege, but declining to stretch the privilege to apply
to a former independent contractor of the defendant); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Medtronic
Vascular, Inc., No. N10C-09-058 JRS CCLD, 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 129, at *18–20 (Del. Super.
Ct. Mar. 13, 2012) (enforcing Medtronic’s privilege because the communications with the former
employee “relate[d] directly to ‘knowledge obtained or conduct that occurred’” while she worked
for Medtronic); Radovic v. City of N.Y., 642 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (reasoning that
the witness’s status as a former city employee was of “no consequence” from a privilege
perspective); Morris v. Scenera Rsch., LLC, No. 09 CVS 19678, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 34, at *17
(N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2011) (relying on In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 606).
55. See, e.g., Salazar, 2011 WL 13205947, at *5 (“[C]ommunications between [corporate]
counsel and [the former employee] which bear on or otherwise potentially affect the [sic] his
testimony, like facts of which he had no prior knowledge but was informed of by counsel and advice
on how to handle deposition questioning, are not privileged . . . .”); City of N.Y. v. Coastal Oil
N.Y., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8667 (RPP), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1010, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000)
(declining to recognize the privilege where the plaintiffs wanted to inquire whether the defendants’
former employee had his memory refreshed by the defendant’s in-house counsel in preparation for
his deposition).
56. See THOMAS E. SPAHN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 126 (3d ed. 2013).
57. See, e.g., Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 197 F.R.D. 303, 306 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(expressing the narrower general rule and then identifying possible exceptions).
58. See, e.g., Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1193–94 (Wash. 2016)
(limiting the scope of the attorney-client privilege to the duration of the employment relationship).
59. See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D.
Mass. 2009) (“As Judges Posner and Easterbrook have repeatedly and accurately observed, with
characteristic bluntness, district court decisions are neither authoritative nor precedential.”).
60. Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38 (D. Conn. 1999).
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Ramon Peralta sued Cendant for employment discrimination.61 His lawyer
deposed Peralta’s former supervisor, Randi Klaber, who no longer worked for
Cendant.62 Peralta’s lawyer asked Klaber if she had discussed the deposition
with anyone.63 Klaber said that she had spoken with Cendant’s lawyer, Maureen
Bresnan.64 Peralta’s lawyer asked Klaber about that conversation, but “Bresnan
objected and instructed [Klaber] not to answer the question.”65 After taking a
break, Peralta’s lawyer “asked [Klaber] what, if anything, she had discussed with
[Bresnan] during the break. [Bresnan] again objected, and instructed her not to
answer.”66 The parties then involved the court in the dispute.67
In a quick telephone hearing, Bresnan stated that she had a “two-way
discussion” with Klaber in preparation for the deposition.68 Klaber reportedly
talked about the facts of the case, and Bresnan told Klaber “about ‘the
defendant’s position.’”69 According to Klaber, their conversation during the
deposition break “involved her request for ‘guidance on how to answer a line of
inquiry that she perceived may cause her problems or may be unclear.’”70 The
parties finished Klaber’s deposition and submitted letter briefs to the court.71
The Peralta court concluded that, under federal law, “any privileged
information” Klaber obtained while employed by Cendant, including “any
information conveyed” by Cendant’s counsel during that time, remained
privileged even after she left Cendant.72 That conclusion did not, however, fully
resolve the parties’ dispute over communications between Klaber and Bresnan
after Klaber left Cendant.73 Thus, the court went on to explain:
To the extent that conversations between Ms. Bresnan and Ms. Klaber
went beyond Ms. Klaber’s knowledge of the circumstances of
[Peralta’s] employment and termination, and beyond Ms. Klaber’s
other activities within the course of her employment with the
defendant, such communications, if any, have not been shown to be
entitled to defendant’s attorney-client privilege. If, for example, Ms.
Bresnan informed Ms. Klaber of facts developed during the litigation,
such as testimony of other witnesses, of which Ms. Klaber would not
have had prior or independent personal knowledge, such
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. (noting that Bresnan only represented Cendant, and did not also represent Klaber).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id.
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communications would not be privileged, particularly given their
potential to influence a witness to conform or adjust her testimony to
such information, consciously or unconsciously. Although it is not
clear from the record of the oral argument what Ms. Bresnan meant by
‘defendant’s position,’ to the extent these communications exceeded
the boundaries discussed above, they are not covered by Cendant’s
attorney-client privilege. Further, with respect to the inquiry into Ms.
Bresnan and Ms. Klaber’s discussions during the break as to how a
question should be handled, they have not been shown to be entitled
to any privilege, and opposing counsel has the right to ask about
matters that may have affected or changed the witness’s testimony.74
The court reasoned that it should be relatively easy to distinguish between
lawyers’
privileged and non-privileged communications with former
employees . . . if the essential point is kept in mind: did the
communication relate to the former employee’s conduct and
knowledge, or communication with [the organization’s] counsel,
during his or her employment? If so, such communication is protected
from disclosure by [the organization]’s attorney-client privilege under
Upjohn.75
In extending the attorney-client privilege to former employees, the Peralta
court might be criticized for having overlooked the Upjohn requirement that
employees be acting at their superiors’ direction when speaking with the
company’s lawyers for the privilege to enclothe those communications.76 But
the Peralta court did, in fact, take Upjohn’s managerial direction requirement
into account in holding as it did. The Peralta court specifically noted that
“wholesale application of the Upjohn principles to former employees as if they
were no different than current employees” was not justified by Upjohn’s
underlying rationale because, as a former employee, Klaber was not speaking
with Bresnan at the direction of Cendant’s management, and she had no duty to
furnish the information sought in her deposition.77 It was principally for this
reason that the court limited the reach of corporations’ attorney-client privilege
to communications that “relate to the former employee’s conduct and
knowledge, or communications with [corporate] counsel, during his or her
employment[.]”78 So, while it certainly is fair to disagree with the Peralta
court’s conclusion, it is not reasonable to criticize the court for supposedly
overlooking one of Upjohn’s essential principles.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
See Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 197 F.R.D. 303, 305 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 40–41.
Id. at 41.
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Many courts follow Peralta.79 Other courts, however, draw the privilege lines
more narrowly than the Peralta court did.80 And, as noted earlier, still other
courts have simply refused to recognize the privilege in connection with former
employees.81
C. A Narrower View of the Privilege’s Application to Former Employees
Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp. is the best-known case taking a narrower
view of an organization’s extension of its attorney-client privilege to former
employees.82 Infosystems involved defendant Sarla Software’s objection to the
deposition of a former employee, Jay Raghvandaran.83 The subpoena for his
deposition commanded him to bring various documents reflecting his
communications with Sarla’s lawyers.84 Sarla argued that Raghvandaran’s
communications with its lawyers were privileged.85 Relying on Peralta, Sarla
asserted that a company’s attorney-client privilege covers communications
between the company’s counsel and a former employee where the
communications (1) concern knowledge obtained or conduct that occurred
during the former employee’s employment with the company; or (2) relate to
privileged communications that occurred during the employment relationship.86
Sarla contended that it was thus entitled to a protective order concerning
Raghvandaran’s deposition.87 The Infosystems court was underwhelmed by
Sarla’s argument.

79. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Alam, No. 15-10516, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100618, at *16–17 (E.D.
Mich. June 9, 2020) (following the Peralta court’s reasoning in applying the attorney-client
privilege to a former employee); Winthrop Res. Corp. v. CommScope, Inc. of N.C., No. 5:11-CV172, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158413, at *9-10 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2014) (discussing Peralta and
concluding that it “govern[ed] the current discovery dispute”); Gioe v. AT&T, Inc., No. CV 094545 (LDW) (AKT), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99066, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010) (quoting
Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41–42); United States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC,
340 F. Supp. 2d 554, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (discussing and adopting the Peralta court’s privilege
test for former employees).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 99-2496 (GK), 2005 WL 8156890,
at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2005) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege did not apply because
the former employee was not, nor could have been, required to meet with the defendant’s lawyers);
Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 305–06 (reasoning that the attorney-client privilege applies only where
the former employee spoke with a lawyer at management’s direction while working for the
organization, the former employee has a “present connection or agency relationship” with the
organization, or the communication concerns a “confidential matter that was uniquely within the
knowledge of the former employee when [s]he worked for the” organization).
81. See, e.g., Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1192–94 (Wash. 2016)
(limiting the attorney-client privilege to the duration of the employment relationship).
82. Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 306.
83. Id. at 304.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 305.
87. See id. at 304 (identifying the motions before the court).
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Addressing Sarla’s second point first, the Infosystems court acknowledged
that privileged communications between an employee and a company’s lawyer
do not automatically lose their protected status when the employee leaves the
company.88 But, that principle was irrelevant here because the subpoenaed
materials did not encompass privileged communications that occurred while
Raghvandaran worked at Sarla.89
With respect to Raghvandaran’s
communications with Sarla’s lawyers concerning his activities or knowledge
acquired during his employment with Sarla, the court reasoned that “the ruling
in Peralta sweeps too broadly.”90
The Infosystems court explained that in ruling as it did, the Peralta court relied
heavily on the principles underlying the subject matter test in Upjohn and on
Chief Justice Burger’s concurring opinion in Upjohn.91 In extending the
attorney-client privilege to former employees, the Peralta court skipped the
Upjohn requirement that an employee must be speaking at the direction of
management for the privilege to apply, which Chief Justice Burger included in
his proposed extension of the privilege to former employees.92 Absent this
element, the Infosystems court observed, former employees do not qualify as the
corporate lawyer’s client, they share no interest with the corporation or other
organization in the outcome of the litigation, and their willingness to furnish
information to the lawyer for the corporation or other organization is not directed
by the entity’s management, but is instead purely voluntary. 93 That being the
case, it is nearly impossible to distinguish a former employee from any other
third party who might have pertinent information about an organizational
litigant.94
The Infosystems court concluded that a lawyer’s “communications with a
former employee of the client corporation generally should be treated no
differently from communications with any other third-party fact witness.”95 To
be sure, the court noted, “there are exceptions to this general rule.”96 For
example, and as the court had previously observed, privileged communications
that took place while the former employee worked for the organization do not
lose their privileged status upon the former employee’s departure.97 There also
may be cases where a former employee maintains an agency or consulting

88. Id. at 305.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., No. 82 C 4585, 1985 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15457, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1985)).
95. Id. at 306.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 124 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Peralta v.
Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Conn. 1999)).
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relationship with an organization, or where a communication between corporate
counsel and a former employee after the former employee has left the
corporation “concerns a confidential matter that was uniquely within the
knowledge of the former employee when he worked for the . . . corporation,”
such that the lawyer’s communications with the former employee “must be
cloaked with the privilege in order for meaningful fact-gathering to occur.”98
Because Sarla claimed the privilege, it had to demonstrate that the lawyers’
communications with Raghvandaran were meaningfully different from those
“with any other third-party witness.”99 Unfortunately for Sarla, it made no such
showing, nor did it submit the subpoenaed materials to the court for in camera
review; rather, it simply stood on its blanket claim of privilege regarding
Raghvandaran’s documents consistent with the holding in Peralta.100 That
approach did not satisfy the Infosystems court, which ordered the production of
Raghvandaran’s documents in connection with his deposition.101
As explained earlier, the Peralta court did not overlook the Upjohn
requirement that an employee must be speaking at the direction of management
for the privilege to apply, which Chief Justice Burger included in his proposed
extension of the privilege to former employees.102 On that point the Infosystems
court was mistaken.
The Infosystems court also too casually analogized former employees to thirdparty fact witnesses. In rejecting the control group test for the attorney-client
privilege, the Upjohn Court recognized that employees outside the corporate
control group could, through actions or decisions within the course and scope of
their employment, expose the corporation to liability.103 It is for this reason that
corporate counsel must be able to speak candidly with employees who have
relevant knowledge of the events that gave rise to the matter at hand.104 An
employee’s departure from the corporation does not diminish her knowledge or
corporate counsel’s need to speak frankly with her to appropriately advise the
corporation. Nor does the employee’s separation from the corporation change
98. Id. (citing Valassis, 143 F.R.D. at 123; Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 40; City of N.Y. v. Coastal
Oil N.Y., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8667 (RPP), 2000 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 1010, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000));
see, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, No. 12-1680, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
199405, at *24–25 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2014) (citing Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 306) (upholding the
attorney-client privilege in this context).
99. Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 306 (citing Valassis, 143 F.R.D. at 125).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 307. The court also rejected Sarla’s claim that the documents at issue were protected
from discovery by the work product doctrine. Id. at 306–07.
102. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
103. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1981) (“Middle-level—and
indeed lower-level—employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the
corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the
relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with
respect to such actual or potential difficulties.”).
104. Id.
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the legal import or effect of her actions or decisions while she was still employed
there. On the other hand, mere third-party fact witnesses never could have
exposed the organization to liability, and there is no need to protect their
communications with corporate counsel as privileged. Given that the attorneyclient privilege endorsed in Upjohn and subsequently embodied in the subject
matter test is “a corporate privilege, not a witness privilege,” and therefore
demands an agency or other close relationship between the corporation and the
person from whom information is sought, it necessarily distinguishes employees
from third-party fact witnesses.105 Extending the privilege to communications
with former employees in specified circumstances does not alter that
differentiation.
D. Rejecting the Privilege in the Former Employee Context
The Infosystems court is not the only court to look askance at attorney-client
privilege claims asserted with respect to communications with an organization’s
former employees. The Washington Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Newman
v. Highland School District No. 203106 is the most negative decision in this line
of authority.
A high school football player, Matthew Newman, sued Highland School
District No. 203 (Highland) for negligence after he sustained a serious brain
injury during a game.107 During discovery, Newman’s lawyers deposed all of
the football coaches on staff at the time of Newman’s injury, including coaches
who were no longer employed by Highland.108 Highland’s lawyer stated at the
depositions that he had previously interviewed the former coaches and that he
was representing them at their depositions.109 After losing a battle to have
Highland’s lawyer disqualified on conflict of interest grounds, Newman sought
to discover the communications between Highland’s lawyer and its former
coaches.”110 Highland moved for a protective order based on the attorney-client
privilege which the trial court generally denied, although it did allow Highland
to retain the privilege during the time that its lawyer represented the former
coaches in connection with their depositions.111 The trial court otherwise
ordered Highland to respond to Newman’s discovery requests.112 After failing
to persuade the Washington Court of Appeals to review the trial court’s order,
Highland won discretionary review of the order by the Washington Supreme
Court, which ordered a temporary stay of discovery.113
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Sexton, supra note 36, at 496–97.
Newman v. Highland School District No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188 (Wash. 2016).
Id. at 1189–90.
Id. at 1190.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1191, 1191 n.1.
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1190–91.
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In the Washington Supreme Court, Highland argued that the flexible Upjohn
approach to an organization’s attorney-client privilege justified extending the
privilege to its lawyer’s post-employment communications with the former
coaches, but the court disagreed.114 Consequently, the court affirmed the trial
court’s denial of Highland’s motion for a protective order and re-opened
discovery.115
In reaching its decision, the Newman court explained that while it had
“embraced Upjohn’s flexible approach to applying the attorney-client privilege
in the corporate client context,” it had never analyzed whether Upjohn supported
expanding the scope of the privilege to include counsel’s communications with
an organization’s former non-managerial employees.116 The court reasoned that
the “flexible approach articulated in Upjohn presupposed attorney-client
communications taking place within the corporate employment relationship,”
inasmuch as the privilege is intended “to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients.”117 In comparison, it made
no sense to expand the attorney-client privilege “to communications outside the
employer-employee relationship because former employees [are] categorically
differ[ent] from current employees with respect to the concerns identified in
Upjohn” and other Washington Supreme Court cases toeing the Upjohn line.118
The court further explained the difference between current and former
employees with respect to the privilege:
A school district, like any organization, can act only through its
constituents and agents. Corporate attorney-client privilege may arise
when “the constituents of an organizational client communicate[ ]
with the organization’s lawyer in that person’s organizational
capacity.” An organizational client, including a governmental agency,
can require its own employees to disclose facts material to their duties
(with some limits not relevant here) to its counsel for investigatory or
litigation purposes.
But everything changes when employment ends. When the employeremployee relationship terminates, this generally terminates the agency
relationship. As a result, the former employee can no longer bind the
corporation and no longer owes duties of loyalty, obedience, and
confidentiality to the corporation. Without an ongoing obligation
between the former employee and employer that gives rise to a
principal-agent relationship, a former employee is no different from

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1191.
Id.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id. (referring to Youngs v. PeaceHealth, 316 P.3d 1035, 1043 (Wash. 2014)).
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other third-party fact witnesses to a lawsuit, who may be freely
interviewed by either party.119
Highland argued that the court should extend the attorney-client privilege to
its communications with the former coaches because the former coaches might
possess vital information about the case, and that their conduct while still
coaching in the district might open Highland to vicarious liability.120 However
valid these concerns might be, they did not, in the Newman court’s eyes,
rationalize stretching the attorney-client privilege beyond its underlying purpose
of fostering full and frank communications between the lawyer and the client.121
In the corporate or other organizational context, that purpose is achieved by
confining the privilege to the period of the employer-employee relationship.122
In contrast, an organization’s and a former employee’s interests may diverge
when their employment relationship ends.123 But regardless of any relationship
between the organization and the former employee, the privilege belongs solely
to the organization, which alone may waive or assert its protections—even to
the former employee’s detriment.124
The court further reasoned that declining to extend the organizational
attorney-client privilege articulated in Upjohn beyond the employment
relationship would ensure “a predictable legal framework.”125 The predictability
of the privilege’s application—which was an important consideration for the
Upjohn court126—was especially vital in Newman, where the issue was the point
at which the privilege ceases to apply vis-à-vis organizational clients and their
employees.127 The Newman court observed that, while everyone “agree[s] that
it cannot extend forever and that it cannot encompass every communication
between corporate counsel and former employees,” it was “difficult to find any
principled line of demarcation that extends beyond the end of the employment
relationship.”128 Ultimately, the court decided that it could adequately protect
the interests served by the privilege by holding that communications between

119. Id. at 1192–93 (alterations in original) (footnotes and citations omitted).
120. Id. at 1193.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(2) (AM. L.
INST. 2000)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“[I]f the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better
than no privilege at all.”).
127. Newman, 381 P.3d at 1193.
128. Id.
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lawyers for an organization and employees during the period of employment
remain privileged after the employment relationship concludes.129
In sum, the trial court correctly rejected Highland’s argument that its attorneyclient privilege applied equally to its lawyers’ communications with current and
former employees.130 Highland could “assert its attorney-client privilege over
communications with the former coaches only [while its lawyer] purportedly
represented them at their depositions.”131
Justice Wiggins dissented.132 He understandably reasoned that former
employees, like current employees, may have relevant information concerning
events that occurred during their tenure that the organization’s lawyer must
know to appropriately advise her client.133 After all, relevant knowledge that
employees gain while working for an organization does not become irrelevant
merely because their employment ended.134 According to Justice Wiggins, the
majority’s dismissal of Highland’s related argument reflected a misreading of
Upjohn.135 Indeed, the enablement of “the flow of relevant and necessary
information from lower-level employees to counsel” was a key reason that the
Upjohn Court discarded the control group test and extended the attorney-client
privilege to lawyers’ communications with mid- and low-level corporate
employees.136
Justice Wiggins favored the “simple test” employed by the Peralta court: “Did
the communications with the former employee, whenever they occurred, ‘relate
to the former employee’s conduct and knowledge, or communication with
defendant’s counsel, during his or her employment?’”137 If they do, the
communications are protected against disclosure by the organization’s attorneyclient privilege in accordance with Upjohn.138
The importance of the decision in Newman is debatable. First, the case
articulates a clear minority rule and includes a lengthy and well-reasoned
dissent. Although many of the opinions upholding the privilege will not bind
other courts, that does not change the fact that Newman is against the weight of
the case law.139

129. Id. at 1193–94.
130. Id. at 1194.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1194–1202 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1197 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in Petroleum
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1198 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (quoting Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41
(D. Conn. 1999)).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 54.
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Second, although the court probably discounted Upjohn’s need-to-know
aspect too deeply, the privilege has never been held to prevent the discovery of
facts known by an employee or former employee.140 In many cases involving
organizational litigants—perhaps even most such cases—communications
between the organization’s lawyer and former employees are focused on facts
known to the former employees from their period of employment. Thus, the
inapplicability of the privilege to former employees under Newman is likely to
come into play in relatively few cases.
Third, under the inclusive Peralta test, the attorney-client privilege still
attaches only to post-employment communications that relate to former
employees’ conduct and knowledge, or to communication with the
organization’s lawyers, during their employment.141 Communications between
an organization’s lawyer and a former employee concerning events that occurred
after the employee left the organization are not privileged.142 Similarly, if a
lawyer informs a former employee of new facts or facts previously unknown to
the former employee, those conversations are not privileged.143 Therefore, much
of the back-and-forth between a lawyer and a former employee that typically
occurs in, for example, deposition preparation, is not protected from discovery
even in jurisdictions that are arguably more enlightened than Washington.144
Fourth, even if the attorney-client privilege does not cloak a lawyer’s
communications with a former employee, those communications may well be
shielded from disclosure by the lawyer’s work product immunity.145 The
protection afforded by work product immunity is broader than that conferred by
the attorney-client privilege in terms of the array of information it shields from
140. See SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ., 291 F. Supp. 3d 681, 685 (E.D. Pa. 2018)
(“[T]he privilege only protects communications from discovery. Facts are discoverable, even if
discussed in privileged communications.”); Ex parte Alfa Ins. Corp., 284 So. 3d 891, 907 (Ala.
2019) (“[A]ttorney-client communications themselves are not discoverable. Discovery is allowed,
however, as to the otherwise discoverable facts that may have been included in the communications
. . . .”); Newman, 381 P.3d at 1191 (“The attorney-client privilege does not shield facts from
discovery, even if transmitted in communications between attorney and client.”); EPSTEIN, supra
note 19, at 116 (“Facts remain discoverable regardless of to whom they have been conveyed.”).
141. Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41.
142. Id.
143. GlobalRock Networks, Inc. v. MCI Commc’ns Servs., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1284
(MAD/RFT), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200814, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012).
144. See Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41–42 (“As to any communication between . . . counsel and a
former employee whom counsel does not represent, which bear on or otherwise potentially affect
the witness’s testimony, consciously or unconsciously, no attorney-client privilege applies.”).
145. See, e.g., Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Enters., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1533 (BSJ)
(JCF), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54154, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011) (“Although there are some
aspects of attorney communications with former employees that are carved out of the attorneyclient privilege, many of these communications are nevertheless protected under the aegis of the
work product doctrine.”); Gioe v. AT&T Inc., No. CV 09-4545 (LDW) (AKT), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99066, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010) (“[T]o the extent that communications between
[d]efense counsel and [the former employee] are specifically counsel’s conclusions or opinions,
they may be covered by work product protection under Rule 26.”).
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discovery. Most obviously, work product immunity is not limited, as is the
privilege, to confidential communications between an attorney and a client.146
Work product immunity is not necessarily waived by the disclosure of
confidential information to a third-party.147 Rather, for disclosure to a thirdparty to waive work product protection, the third-party must be an adversary or
a conduit to an adversary.148 Former employees generally do not fit this
description and, thus, lawyers’ communications with them that otherwise satisfy
the requirements for work product immunity are typically off-limits to an
opposing party.149
In terms of protection against discovery, tangible work product immunity is
extraordinarily difficult to overcome.150 A lawyer’s opinion work product
presents an even higher hurdle. Opinion work product generally enjoys almost

146. Reg’l Airport Auth. v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d 697, 713 (6th Cir. 2006).
147. See, e.g., Blattman v. Scaramellino, 891 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting this principle);
In re Grand Jury Matter #3, 847 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2017) (waiving the attorney-client privilege
by forwarding an e-mail message to a third party did not also waive work product immunity); In re
Lake Lotawana Cmty. Improvement Dist., 563 B.R. 909, 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2016) (asserting
that “[m]ere disclosure to a third party does not waive the work product” immunity and concluding
that a party did not waive work product protection through disclosure to a mediator); BouSamra v.
Excela Health, 210 A.3d 967, 979 (Pa. 2019) (“Attorney work product need be kept confidential
only from the adversary.”).
148. Ayers Oil Co. v. Am. Bus. Brokers, Inc., No. 2:09 CV 02 DDN, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111928, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2009); O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d 299, 313 (N.J.
2014); BouSamra, 210 A.3d at 978; State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 64 A.3d 1183, 1196 (R.I. 2013);
Kittitas Cnty. v. Allphin, 416 P.3d 1232, 1241 (Wash. 2018).
149. See, e.g., Gavin v. Liberty Mut. Grp. Inc., No. 11-cv-159-LM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
109416, at *15–17 (D.N.H. Aug. 6, 2012) (ruling that a lawyer’s communications with a former
employee were protected by the work product doctrine); Trudeau v. N.Y. State Consumer Prot.
Bd., 237 F.R.D. 325, 338 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he exchange of [work product] with those whose
expertise and knowledge of certain facts can help the attorney in the assessment of any aspect of
the litigation does not invoke a waiver of the [work product] doctrine.”); Export-Import Bank of
the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Pre-deposition
conversations may also be work product; to the extent [the plaintiff’s] attorneys communicated
their legal opinions and theories of the case [to the former employee], their conversations are
immune from discovery.”). But see SEC v. Gupta, 281 F.R.D. 169, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“When
an attorney discloses work product to prepare a non-party witness for a deposition, and that witness
does not share a common interest with the attorney’s client, there has been a deliberate, affirmative
and selective use of work product that waives the privilege.”).
150. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (requiring a showing of “substantial need” and
“undue hardship” to discover “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative”).

60

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70.1:1

impenetrable protection against discovery—yielding only in isolated and
exceptional situations151—and in some states is unassailable.152
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAWYERS
Lawyers for corporations or other organizational clients who are grappling
with the application of the organization’s attorney-client privilege to their
communications with former employees must first be sure to check the
controlling jurisdiction’s law. If the case is in federal court on diversity
jurisdiction grounds, the court is bound to apply the forum state’s law.153 If the
forum state is one of the handful of states that still applies the control group test
when evaluating organizational clients’ privilege claims, the privilege simply
will not attach to communications with former employees.154 If the forum state
employs the subject matter or modified subject matter test, on the other hand,
there is hope. Unfortunately, reported state court decisions addressing the

151. Drummond Co. v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP, 885 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422 (11th Cir. 1994)); Smith v. Scottsdale
Ins. Co., 621 F. App’x 743, 746 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394,
403 (4th Cir. 1999)); Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 869 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); Deloitte, 610 F.3d at
135 (quoting Dir., Off. of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C.
Cir. 1997)); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Ford
Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 962 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997)); United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius
Baer & Co., Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 3d 220, 223 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Dir., Off. of Thrift Supervision,
124 F.3d at 1307); Entergy Ark., Inc., v. Francis, 549 S.W.3d 362, 371 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018).
152. See, e.g., Chua v. Johnson, 784 S.E.2d 449, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“Unlike the qualified
privilege afforded other work product, opinion work product is entitled to an absolute privilege and
is therefore absolutely protected from disclosure.”); TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Kesling, 15 N.E.3d
985, 995 (Ind. 2014) (discussing the proper interpretation of Indiana Trial Rule 26(B)(3)); Dubois
v. Off. of the Att’y Gen., 185 A.3d 734, 741 (Me. 2018) (stating that a party is “not entitled to
[discover] records that contain an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories concerning the litigation”); State ex rel. Malashock v. Jamison, 502 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Mo.
2016) (“The work product doctrine precludes discovery of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories . . . created or commissioned by counsel in preparation for possible
litigation.”) (citing State ex rel Ford Motor Co. v. Westbrooke, 151 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Mo. 2004)
(en banc)); Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 399 P.3d 334, 347 (Nev. 2017) (quoting
Wardleigh v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 891 P.2d 1180, 1189 (Nev. 1995)); Henderson v. Newport
Cnty. Reg’l YMCA, 966 A.2d 1242, 1247 (R.I. 2009) (“[O]pinion work product qualifies for
absolute immunity from discovery and under no circumstance may another party obtain, through
discovery methods, an attorney’s recorded thoughts and theories.”); In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co.,
532 S.W.3d 794, 803–04 (Tex. 2017) (stating that “[c]ore work product” is not discoverable).
153. See, e.g., Barr v. Ewing, 774 F. App’x 547, 551 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Because state law
supplies the rule of decision in this case, we must apply Florida attorney-client privilege principles
to determine whether the district court erred here.”); In re Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 736 F. App’x 392,
394 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Because this is a diversity action involving claims for which South Carolina
law provides the rule of decision, South Carolina’s law of attorney-client privilege applies.”).
154. See, e.g., Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (applying Illinois law and refusing to extend the privilege to former employees under the
control group test).
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privilege’s application to lawyers’ communications with organizational clients’
former employees are few and far between; many states have apparently not
decided the issue. In most diversity cases, then, lawyers will be left to argue for
the application of the privilege based on the persuasive force of the multiple
federal court decisions on the subject. That said, state courts regularly look to
well-reasoned federal decisions for guidance when deciding cases155—
especially when the state case involves issues of first impression.156 Where
federal law controls the question, lawyers have ample authority to support a
privilege argument,157 although many of the cases are district court decisions
and therefore are persuasive authority rather than precedential.158
When asserting the privilege, the lawyers for the organization must remember
that there is no blanket privilege covering all attorney-client communications.159
This is as true where former employees are concerned as it is anywhere else.160
The party asserting the attorney-client privilege must establish that the privilege
applies to each communication sought to be withheld.161 The form of the
communication between the former employee and the lawyer is irrelevant to the
attorney-client privilege analysis as long as the communication otherwise
qualifies as privileged. For example, the privilege attaches to telephone calls,
155. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Consol. Derivative Litig., 976 A.2d 872, 882 (Del. Ch.
2009) (“In applying Delaware law, I look, as courts often do, to well-reasoned precedent from
federal courts, courts of our sister states, and our Anglo–American jurisprudential tradition.”).
156. See, e.g., Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798, 805 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2019) (quoting Futrell v. Payday Cal., Inc., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 524 n.6 (Ct. App. 2010));
Wills v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 357 P.3d 453, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting
CIT Grp./Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Horizon Potash Corp., 884 P.2d 821, 823 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)).
157. See cases cited supra note 54.
158. See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D.
Mass. 2009) (“As Judges Posner and Easterbrook have repeatedly and accurately observed, with
characteristic bluntness, district court decisions are neither authoritative nor precedential.”); see
also Kremers v. Coca-Cola Co., 714 F. Supp. 2d 912, 917 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (citations omitted)
(“While the Court is perfectly well aware that . . . the opinions of district courts are not precedents,
decisions of coordinate courts are entitled to this Court’s respectful attention and to such weight as
their persuasive value commands.”).
159. In re LeFande, 919 F.3d 554, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263,
1270 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 303 P.3d 1187, 1199
(Colo. 2013) (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mr. S), 662 F.3d 65, 72 n.3 (1st Cir. 2011));
Maldonado v. Kiewit La. Co., 152 So. 3d 909, 927 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cacamo v. Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 So. 2d 1210, 1216 (La. Ct. App. 2001)).
160. See, e.g., In re Morning Song Bird Food Litig., No. 3:12-cv-01592, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 198109, at *7–8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2017) (rejecting blanket privilege assertions with
respect to a former employee’s deposition preparation); Misner v. Potter, No. 2:07-CV-0330 TS,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136920, at *5 (D. Utah June 19, 2008) (agreeing with the “plaintiff that
[d]efendant [could] not assert a ‘blanket privilege’” regarding communications with former
employees).
161. In re Grand Jury Proc., 616 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued on June 9, 1982, 697 F.2d 277, 279 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Foster,
188 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999)); Sapia v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 351 F. Supp. 3d
1125, 1132 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Slaven v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 83 F. Supp. 3d 789, 796 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
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personal conversations, letters, notes, text messages, and e-mail messages.162
Nonverbal communications—such as nods, shakes of the head, gestures, winks,
and even silence—may also be privileged.163
Lawyers must also properly perform the ministerial acts that accompany the
assertion of the privilege. For example, lawyers must ensure that they timely
prepare privilege logs that satisfy local court rules lest they waive the privilege
through their failure to comply.164 Courts’ privilege log requirements may be
onerous. For instance, a Kansas federal court explained that a privilege log must:
(1) describe the document (such as an e-mail message, letter, or memorandum);
(2) identify the date the document was prepared; (3) list the date of the document
if it differs from the date the document was prepared; (4) identify who prepared
the document; (5) identify the person or people for whom the document was
prepared, as well as those to whom the document was directed; (6) state the
purpose for which the document was prepared; (7) give the document’s length
in page numbers; (8) state whether the document is being withheld based on the
attorney-client privilege or work product immunity; and (9) furnish any other
information necessary to establish the elements of the privilege or work product
doctrine.165 With respect to element (5), the court explained that a log requires
“an evidentiary showing based on competent evidence supporting any assertion”
that a lawyer supervised the document’s creation.166 In connection with element
(6), the court stated that a privilege log must include an evidentiary showing,
based on competent evidence, that the document meets the work product
doctrine’s anticipation of litigation requirement.167
Regardless of whether the privilege attaches to a lawyer’s communications
with a former employee, the lawyer should also analyze whether the
communication enjoys work product immunity.168 “As with the attorney-client
privilege, an assertion that a document [or other information] is protected by the
work product doctrine must be established by specific facts and not conclusory
statements.”169 Again, as with the privilege, the party asserting work product
immunity bears the burden of showing that the doctrine applies to the
information in question.170 Furthermore, documents or other information or
materials sought to be withheld from discovery as work product must be listed
162. See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 89 (stating that a “communication may be oral or written”).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1527.
165. In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Pracs. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 669, 673 (D. Kan. 2005).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Schoenmann v. FDIC, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that a
bankruptcy trustee’s e-mail messages to and from the former CEO of a failed bank, as well as draft
documents attached to those messages, constituted work product and consequently were protected
from disclosure).
169. Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., 285 F.R.D. 376, 382 (W.D. Va. 2012).
170. Gillespie v. Charter Commc’ns, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1201 (E.D. Mo. 2015); Kannaday
v. Ball, 292 F.R.D. 640, 644 (D. Kan. 2013).
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and suitably described on a party’s privilege log to preserve related immunity
claims.171
Some lawyers for organizational litigants may be tempted to additionally
represent former employees to create an attorney-client relationship and thereby
shield their communications as privileged, either in connection with the former
employees’ depositions—as the defense lawyer in Newman did—or more
broadly.172 There is much not to like about this strategy. First, it is not
guaranteed to succeed. The lawyer’s voluntary representation of a former
employee will not shield information that does not independently qualify for
protection under the attorney-client privilege.173 Second, the opposing party
could argue that a claimed attorney-client relationship is a sanctionable ruse
intended to unlawfully obstruct that party’s access to evidence.174 An argument
along those lines may find traction with a court in some circumstances. Third,
and depending on the facts, a lawyer who accepts a former employee’s
representation (even for the limited purpose of a deposition) may unwittingly
create a concurrent conflict of interest with the lawyer’s organizational client.175
Again depending on the facts, such a conflict of interest may or may not be
curable by informed consent.176
Finally, and fundamentally, lawyers should be very circumspect about what
they say to former employees of an organizational client. Even in jurisdictions
that recognize the attorney-client privilege in the former employee context, the
privilege does not attach to communications between a lawyer for the
organization and a former employee whom the lawyer does not represent,
“which bear on or otherwise potentially affect” the former employee’s
testimony, whether “consciously or unconsciously.”177 Thus, and by way of
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii).
172. Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1190, 1194 (Wash. 2016).
173. See Wade Williams Distrib., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., No. 00 Civ. 5002 (LMM), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12152, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2004) (citing Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190
F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Conn. 1999)).
174. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating
that “a lawyer shall not: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence”).
175. See id. r. 1.7(a) (outlining concurrent client conflicts of interest).
176. See id. r. 1.7(b) (specifying the requirements for consent to a concurrent conflict of
interest).
177. Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 42; see, e.g., In re Morning Song Bird Food Litig., No. 3:12-cv01592, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198109, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2017) (adopting this approach);
Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc., No. CV 04-9049 DOC (RNBx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101641, at
*26–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2010) (quoting United States v. 22.80 Acres of Land, 107 F.R.D. 20, 25
(N.D. Cal. 1985)) (noting that “Federal Rule of Evidence 612 renders discoverable ‘[documents]
reviewed prior to a deposition’” and that “[a]ny privilege or work product protection against
disclosure is deemed waived as to those portions so reviewed[,]” and ordering the production of all
privileged documents that the witness reviewed “to refresh her recollection prior to her
deposition”); Schaffrath v. Hamburg Twp., No. 07-14909-CV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1354, at *4–
6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2009) (granting the plaintiff’s motion to re-depose the defendant’s former
employee “for the purposes of inquiring into conversations he had with [d]efense [c]ounsel in
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example, a lawyer’s efforts to refresh a former employee’s recollection before
the former employee’s deposition likely will be discoverable. As explained
earlier, communications between an organization’s lawyer and a former
employee concerning events that occurred after the employee left the
organization are not privileged, nor are communications in which the lawyer
informs the former employee of new facts or facts that were previously unknown
to the former employee.178 In summary, the safest approach for lawyers is to
assume that communications with former employees who they do not represent
will not be privileged and proceed accordingly.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under what may fairly be characterized as the majority approach, courts that
apply the subject matter or modified subject matter tests when deciding whether
a lawyer’s communications with a current employee of an organizational client
are protected by the organization’s attorney-client privilege extend the privilege
to communications with former employees in certain circumstances. To be
privileged, a communication must relate to the former employee’s conduct and
knowledge, or communications with the organization’s lawyers, during the
person’s employment by the organization. In contrast, communications between
an organization’s lawyer and a former employee about events that occurred after
the employee left the organization are not privileged. This is a sound approach
that recognizes the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege while, at
the same time, reasonably allowing opposing parties access to relevant evidence.
For lawyers who are nonetheless concerned about the potential application of
the privilege to their communications with former employees of their
organizational clients, salvation may lie in the work product doctrine, which
does not require the existence of an attorney-client relationship to protect
information as confidential and applies to a wider array of information and
materials. Of course, cautious lawyers may simply assume that communications
with former employees who they do not represent will not be privileged or
otherwise shielded from disclosure and conduct themselves accordingly.

anticipation of his deposition testimony” that may have influenced his testimony, including
“induc[ing] him to conform his testimony to the other witnesses in the case who had already been
deposed”).
178. See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.

